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Abstract 
This study examines strategic alliances as channels for tax knowledge diffusion between firms. Despite 
solid insights on within-firm determinants of tax planning, little is known about tax knowledge diffusion 
via cross-firm connections. Since theory suggests that the role of strategic alliances in tax knowledge 
diffusion is ambiguous, we test our notion empirically. To tease out potential tax knowledge diffusion, 
we analyze changes in the tax planning behavior of high-tax firms in strategic alliances with low-tax 
firms in comparison to high-tax firms in strategic alliances with other high-tax firms. We apply a 
multivariate regression model, a difference-in-differences approach and use basic textual analysis to 
identify the main business purpose of a strategic alliance. We find a substantial increase in the tax 
planning behavior of high-tax firms in strategic alliances with low-tax firms relative to high-tax firms 
in high-tax strategic alliances. Additionally, our results suggests that high-tax firms are able to adjust 
their tax planning behavior within two years of network initiation when cooperating with low-tax firms. 
Because we are also able to provide a series of robustness checks, we interpret the identified responses 
to be consistent with existing tax knowledge diffusion via strategic alliances. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Tax Planning/Avoidance, Knowledge Diffusion, Network, Strategic Alliance. 
JEL Qualification: C31, G34, H26.  
Data: Data are available from public and/or subscription-based sources identified in the paper. 
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1. Introduction 
Varying levels of control and commitment to affiliates allow a firm to tailor its operational organization 
to its actual needs. One means of striving for optimal corporate institutionalization is cooperation with 
other firms. The relevance of this investment alternative is emphasized by the observation that firms 
currently plan to disrupt other industries by entering them via partnerships and cooperation (PwC, 2018). 
Generally, cooperation is expected to lead to information gathering and knowledge spillovers (e.g., see 
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006)), which are intuitively desirable for both investing firms and outsiders, 
such as governmental institutions. However, recent literature suggests that cross-firm connections could 
play a crucial role in the diffusion of tax planning practices between firms. Consequently, the perception 
and valuation of such spillovers would highly depend on the respective point of view. To the best of our 
knowledge, very little is known about the interplay of cooperation and corporate taxation. Thus, the key 
innovation of our study lies in analyzing whether strategic alliances serve as channels for tax knowledge 
diffusion between firms.  
Generally, corporate cooperation is arranged either as a separate legal entity with equity participations 
for the involved parties or on a contractual basis. While the former type is usually referred to as (equity) 
joint venture, the latter is a so-called strategic alliance. Differences between joint ventures and strategic 
alliances are, however, not limited to their contractual/equity basis. Basically, strategic alliances may be 
regarded as “lying somewhere in between single-firm activity and spot contracting” (Lindsey, 2008), 
involving mutual commitment not typically found in arm’s-length market transactions but having less 
impact on the partnering firms’ operations than equity joint ventures (Chan et al., 1997). In contrast to 
equity joint ventures, strategic alliances themselves are not subject to corporate taxation. This is useful 
for us, as we are not interested in whether firms potentially use joint ventures as vehicles in tax planning 
activities but in whether cooperation may serve as a channel through which tax knowledge diffuses 
between firms. We thereby define tax knowledge as a firm’s ability to maximize its nonconforming tax 
planning activities.  
We empirically exploit information on strategic alliances, which we also refer to as “networks”, between 
publicly traded US firms. Given that accounting data are available for a network’s participants, we 
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reshape data from the alliance to the participant level (network-firm-observations). Our base sample 
contains 4,159 network-firm-observations, which translate to 2,064 strategic alliances by 1,603 unique 
firms and 19,447 overall firm-year-observations between 1994 and 2016. Among these observations, 
we identify low-tax and high-tax networks. These are characterized by the presence of at least one low-
tax firm as a participant or by initiation by undersheltered firm respectively (high-tax firms). To tease 
out (potential) tax knowledge diffusion, we analyze changes in the tax planning behavior of high-tax 
firms in strategic alliances with low-tax firms in comparison to high-tax firms in strategic alliances with 
high-tax firms. Thereby, we rule out alternative explanations, such as the overall influence of a network 
on a firm’s tax planning behavior or reversion to the mean. We gain insights into the actual business of 
a network by applying a basic textual analysis approach. For our inferences, we apply a multivariate 
regression design and a difference-in-differences (DiD) model, which both complement a descriptive 
analysis. Covariates on partner, network  and firm characteristics are included in the regression models 
and account for a broad range of influences. We find a substantial increase in the tax planning behavior, 
measured as cash taxes paid, of high-tax firms in strategic alliances with low-tax firms relative to high-
tax firms in high-tax strategic alliances. Consequently, the results from our analyses support strategic 
alliances as channels through which tax knowledge diffuses between firms. Additionally, we test 
whether partner characteristics intensify or mitigate the identified learning effects but find that tax 
knowledge diffusion via strategic alliances is rather unaffected by such heterogeneity.  
Our study refers to the emerging literature on channels through which tax knowledge diffuses between 
firms. Despite solid insights on within-firm determinants of tax planning (Lisowsky, 2010), little is 
known about cross-firm connections in this field. By examining a potential determinant of cross-
sectional variation in tax planning practices among firms, we follow the calls for contributions to the 
understanding of this matter (Cen et al., 2018; Dyreng and Maydew, 2017; Wilson, 2009). Recent 
research has turned to cross-firm connections, analyzing board ties (Brown, 2011; Brown and Drake, 
2014), banks (Gallemore, Gipper, and Maydew, 2018), human capital turnover (Barrios and Gallemore, 
2018), auditors (Frey, 2018; Lim et al., 2018) and the supply chain (Cen et al., 2017, 2018). We extend 
this literature by analyzing the role of strategic alliances in tax knowledge diffusion. Since strategic 
alliances are established on a peer-to-peer basis between the participants and are thus directly associated 
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with a firm’s organizational level, we discuss whether networks provide a conceptual framework for 
successful tax knowledge diffusion. Subsequently, we test our notion empirically.   
We further contribute to the management literature on knowledge diffusion via strategic alliances. 
Empirical inferences in such studies are usually based on the contracting parties’ stock price 
performance (Boone and Ivanov, 2012; Mohanram and Nanda, 1996; Chen, King, and Wen, 2015; 
Anand and Khanna, 2000), return on equity, (cash flow) return on assets (Chan et al., 1997; Porrini, 
2004) and post-reorganization performance (Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006; Ishii 
and Xuan, 2014; Porrini, 2004). While firms are often found to benefit from what they learn in alliances 
in other contexts, not all corporate practices diffuse in the same way (Cai et al., 2014). To the best of 
our knowledge, we are the first to measure knowledge diffusion via strategic alliances based on a firm’s 
tax planning behavior. Our study therefore not only aligns with accounting and management research 
but also develops a new measure of knowledge diffusion via strategic alliances.  
In the next section, we thoroughly review the related literature to discuss how tax knowledge diffuses 
between firms and which role strategic alliances could take in such diffusion. Subsequently, we explain 
our data exploitation and identification strategies. We discuss an appropriate research design and then 
present and discuss the results of our study. Before this paper closes with a brief conclusion, we provide 
several sensitivity analyses.  
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2. Conceptual Framework & Prior Literature 
2.1. Channels for Tax Knowledge Diffusion 
The extensive research that considers firm-level characteristics to explain the development and variation 
of tax planning activities by firms underlines the perceived importance of corporate taxes in economic 
theory, politics and society (for comprehensive reviews, see Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and Wilde 
and Wilson (2018)). Despite these solid insights on the within-firm determinants of tax planning 
(Lisowsky, 2010), little is known about tax knowledge diffusion via cross-firm connections. Given the 
substantial economic impact of tax planning activities (Tørsløv, Wier, and Zucman, 2018), one 
intuitively aligns practices by tax advisors with increased tax planning. Recent research suggests the 
existence of further channels, by investigating tax planning ecosystems between firms. Consequently, a 
“better understanding of the actual tax strategies being used” is needed (Dyreng and Maydew, 2017). 
Brown (2011) pioneered in this literature strand by examining the spread of a specific tax planning tool, 
the corporate-owned life insurance shelter. While she finds that board interlocks and (to some extent) 
geographical proximity increase the probability that a firm adopts the shelter from a prior user, she does 
not find significant shelter adoption via shared audit firms. The latter result, although theoretically 
convincing due to independence regulations on audit services, is somewhat surprising given the large 
literature on auditors trespassing their limited scope of function (Aobdia, 2015; Cai et al., 2016; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2016; McGuire, Omer, and Wang, 2012). Calibrating from the audit-firm level to the 
individual audit engagement partner, Frey (2018) suggests that the engagement of a German tax certified 
auditor, who signals high competency in taxes, is associated with higher effective tax rates at client 
firms. In contrast, Lim et al. (2018), find that Chinese firms with stronger connections to low-tax firms 
through individual audit partners show lower effective tax rates. Further disentangling intermediaries as 
channels for tax knowledge diffusion, Barrios and Gallemore (2018) document that firms exhibit 
increasing tax planning when they hire tax staff from sophisticated tax planners. This finding is 
consistent with inferences from analyzing board ties to low-tax firms (Brown and Drake, 2014). 
Gallemore, Gipper, and Maydew (2018) show that firms experience meaningful tax reductions when 
they start a relationship with a bank whose existing clients engage in tax planning. 
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[Figure 1] 
These studies are conceptually aligned by the presence of intermediaries who implement tax planning 
expertise in their set of contracts and transfer the tax knowledge gained to other parties they are 
contracting with. Intermediaries are found to play a key role in the acquisition and dissemination of 
information in many research fields (e.g., see Di Maggio et al. (2019)). In the context of tax knowledge 
diffusion, this could, for instance, be perceived as a violation of auditor independence (McGuire, Omer, 
and Wang, 2012). Figure 1 categorizes prior research on channels through which tax knowledge 
diffuses. It aligns the framework (institutional setting) to identified channels. While research on tax 
knowledge diffusion focuses on the role of intermediaries, Cen et al. (2017) and Cen et al. (2018) analyze 
peer-to-peer contracting between firms. Specifically, they focus on tax knowledge diffusion via the 
supply chain and document that customers and suppliers both increase tax planning activities once their 
relationship is considered dependent. Strikingly, Cen et al. (2018) suggest that customers and their 
suppliers share tax planning benefits through lower product prices. While evidence for intended sharing 
of tax benefits is scarce (for instance, see Erickson (1998) and Erickson and Wang (1999)), an explicit 
transfer of tax knowledge aligns the “supply chain channel” with research on intermediaries.  
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2.2. Strategic Alliances and Tax Knowledge Diffusion 
With our study, we broaden the research on how tax knowledge diffuses between firms via peer-to-peer 
contracting. We therefore elaborate on different characteristics of tax knowledge, which could impede 
or facilitate spillovers in strategic alliances, and subsequently resolve whether strategic alliances 
establish an organizational form of collusion that allows for knowledge spillovers.  
2.2.1. Tax Knowledge 
Repeated business transactions are found to enable knowledge spillovers (Isaksson, Simeth, and Seifert, 
2016). However, not all corporate practices diffuse in the same way (Cai et al., 2014), as major barriers 
to knowledge spillovers are shown to be knowledge-related factors (Szulanski, 1996). While explicit 
knowledge can easily be codified and is systematically transferable, tacit knowledge is hard to formulate 
and communicate because it “is deeply rooted in action, commitment, and involvement in a specific 
context” (Nonaka, 1994). Consequently, the more (tax) knowledge qualifies as explicit, the more easily 
transferable it should be (Meier, 2011). When classifying tax knowledge, one might reflexively refer to 
it as tacit given the substantial complexity of corporate taxes (Hoppe et al., 2019) and the increased 
uncertainty (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2018; Guenther, Matsunaga, and Williams, 2017) and costs 
of (Hundsdoerfer and Jacob, 2018) tax planning. One also has to consider that know-how is somewhat 
sticky, difficult to codify and therefore more tacit than pure information (Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter, 
2000). However, anecdotal evidence suggests that tax shelters, such as the German family office shelter 
for limited partnerships, are repetitive among firms and not limited to a particular industry. Recent 
findings suggest tax knowledge to rather be of explicit nature, given the inferences on the corporate-
owned life insurance shelter (Brown, 2011) or lease-in, lease-out transactions (Wilson, 2009). Lisowsky 
(2010) further argues that a significant portion of tax shelters serve as mass market tax saving ideas for 
advisors.  
2.2.2. Successful (Tax) Knowledge Diffusion 
According to Rogers (2003), diffusion requires communication through channels over time among 
members of a social system. In accomplishing a common goal, the contracting parties of a strategic 
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alliance are engaged in joint problem solving via a social system. Consistent with this, cooperation is 
found to mitigate problems ensuing from cultural differences (Kogut and Singh, 1988). Spillovers are 
also more likely to occur in cases of an high frequency of interactions between firms (Isaksson, Simeth, 
and Seifert, 2016) and with increasing partner trustworthiness (Jiang et al., 2016). Regarded as “lying 
somewhere in between single-firm activity and spot contracting” (Lindsey, 2008) and presenting 
increased mutual commitment in comparison to arm’s-length market transactions (Chan et al., 1997), 
strategic alliances further comply with the diffusion requirements proposed by Rogers. Empirical 
inferences about knowledge diffusion via strategic alliances are usually based on the contracting parties’ 
stock price performance (Boone and Ivanov, 2012; Mohanram and Nanda, 1996; Chen, King, and Wen, 
2015; Anand and Khanna, 2000), return on equity, (cash flow) return on assets (Chan et al., 1997; 
Porrini, 2004) and post-reorganization performance (Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Higgins and Rodriguez, 
2006; Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Porrini, 2004). Other scholars apply exploratory approaches by conducting 
surveys (Dyer and Hatch, 2006) or interviews (Inkpen, 2008). Often, firms are found to benefit from 
what they learn in alliances in other contexts (Porrini, 2004). Based on these findings, strategic alliances 
should provide a good channel for the successful diffusion of tax knowledge.  
Although cooperation is found to be associated with knowledge spillovers, tension arises from various 
aspects. First, limits to the recipient’s absorptive capacity create a barrier to knowledge diffusion (Dyer 
and Hatch, 2006; Szulanski, 1996). With regard to tax planning, cooperation could also induce 
complexity in the contracting parties’ organization and reduce a firm’s ability to fine-tune the tax 
sheltering of its affiliates (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004). Additionally, both cooperation (Chen, King, 
and Wen, 2015) and tax planning are found to increase an organization’s uncertainty (Dyreng, Hanlon, 
and Maydew, 2018). Thus, even prudent managers could expect the marginal disutility of uncertainty to 
exceed the benefits of acquired tax knowledge. Furthermore, firms need to find ways not only to derive 
critical know-how from their alliance partners but also to protect themselves from losing their own core 
capabilities (Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter, 2000). Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria (1998) frame this in the 
context of earning private benefits in an alliance, which permits the firm to apply what it learns to its 
business outside the scope of the alliance and therefore harms the cooperation by inducing 
underinvestment in shared learning. 
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2.2.3. Mechanisms  
Inkpen (2000) describes learning through networks as a multi-stage process, consisting of forming a 
network, gaining access to knowledge and adopting the knowledge. However, there is little evidence on 
how knowledge diffusion (i.e., spillover) occurs. Chan et al. (1997) identify optimal decision making 
authority, organizational flexibility and control of opportunistic behavior as major drivers for value 
creation within a strategic alliance. Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria (1998) argue that although contracting 
parties must invest in learning, both parties need not earn private benefits. They argue that a firm [with 
poor tax knowledge]1 would not have an incentive to continue the alliance once it had earned private 
benefits [tax knowledge spillover] if its private benefits exceeded the common benefits. The other party 
[with sophisticated tax knowledge] would then “race” to earn benefits itself before termination of the 
alliance. As such racing behaviors appear to be mutually reinforcing, common benefits would still be 
attainable (Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998). Furthermore, strategic alliances enhance managerial 
flexibility because the contracting parties are not fully committed to the investment (Chen, King, and 
Wen, 2015), while Fiol and Lyles (1985) highlight that the probability of learning increases with an 
organizational structure that allows innovativeness and new insights. Employees who are seconded to a 
strategic alliance are involved in not only the alliance’s business as such but also the monitoring of the 
alliance and the partner. Within-organization reporting thus creates opportunities for experience-
sharing. The observation of tax planning effectively implemented by other participants in a network 
could increase a firm’s management confidence in implementing the respective tax planning activity as 
well. This learning by observation would be consistent with knowledge diffusion being a gradual process 
of dissemination (Szulanski, 1996), with increasing probability of uniformity of actions over time in 
networks (Gale and Kariv, 2003) and with anecdotal evidence on tax advisors heavily pitching tax 
planning ideas across the population of firms with only partial success from the spot. Gained confidence 
could overcome the (irrational) fear of reputational costs from engaging in tax planning (Gallemore, 
Maydew, and Thornock, 2014; Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). With regard to supply chains, Cen et al. 
(2018) suggest that intentional tax knowledge transfers enhance or at least maintain supply chain 
                                                     
1 Content in square brackets is added by the authors.  
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stability. Strategic alliances are also exposed to instability that is inherent in their institutionalization 
and specific to cooperation. Cultural differences, product market competition, availability of new 
technology, cost differences, market entry barriers, deadlocks, or imitation of a partner cause this 
instability. Participants in a strategic alliance could therefore follow the intuition of Cen et al. (2018) 
and share tax knowledge to establish bonding mechanisms.  
Given the aforementioned variety of potential mechanisms, we do not expect that tax knowledge 
diffusion via strategic alliances is exposing itself in (one) specific accounting measure(s). Rather more, 
the experiences of others and the communication structure between parties (analytically) explain 
information flows (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Blonski, 1999). Consequently, we expect tax knowledge 
diffusion via strategic alliances to be driven by several soft factors. If we observed actual exploitation 
of opportunities for tax knowledge diffusion, we could shed light on knowledge spillovers in peer-to-
peer contracting. Thus, it remains an empirical question whether strategic alliances actually serve as 
channels for tax knowledge diffusion between firms.   
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3. Data 
[Table 1] 
3.1. Sample Construction 
We exploit data on strategic alliances from Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Platinum database on 
strategic alliances over the period 1994–2016.2 SDC is widely used in relevant research on corporate 
cooperation (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Boone and Ivanov, 2012; Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Chen, King, 
and Wen, 2015; Ishii and Xuan, 2014), and its accuracy is generally perceived as very high for most 
items (Anand and Khanna, 2000). SDC issues data at the strategic alliance level. We reshape data from 
the alliance to the participant level because accounting data are available for the (publicly traded) 
contracting parties. For instance, a strategic alliance between two participants translates to a network-
firm-observation for each of the two firms. Compustat provides us with firm-year-level accounting 
information, and we merge SDC and Compustat data using a firm’s six-digit CUSIP number (at the level 
of the ultimate parent of the participant) as an identifier. Although SDC provides reliable network-
observations from the beginning of 1990 onwards, we start our sample in 1994 due to changes in 
reporting requirements on cash taxes paid (Cen et al., 2017). We end our sample in 2016 to exclude any 
inferences from the 2017 US tax reform. Furthermore, we respectively consider strategic alliances 
between publicly traded firms incorporated and headquartered in the US and in which all contracting 
parties are identified in Compustat (Table 1 Panel A). Our base sample contains 4,159 network-firm- 
observations, which translate to 2,064 strategic alliances by 1,603 unique firms and 19,447 overall firm-
year-observations. 
  
                                                     
2 A list of the requested data items is available from the authors upon request.  
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3.2. Identification Strategy  
[Figure 2] 
3.2.1. Measuring Tax Knowledge  
For purposes of this study, we define tax knowledge as a firm’s ability to maximize its nonconforming 
tax planning activities. The lingua franca in measuring the degree to which a firm is able to succeed in 
this attempt is the effective tax rate, which puts tax expenses and pre-tax book income into perspective. 
The interpretation of effective tax rates is fairly straightforward, and an advantage is that, even though 
conceptually incorrect, they are widely used as input for corporate decisions on new investment (Graham 
et al., 2017). We base our inferences on the cash effective tax rate (𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅) because 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅 also 
captures tax deferral strategies (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Furthermore, we apply a multi-period (3-
year) form of 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅 (Brown and Drake, 2014; Barrios and Gallemore, 2018; Gallemore, Gipper, 
and Maydew, 2018), because we expect tax knowledge spillovers to occur more likely over time.  
 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑖,𝑡=1 =
∑ (3𝑡=1 𝑡𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑖,𝑡)
∑ (3𝑡=1 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡)
 (1) 
The terms 𝑡𝑥𝑝𝑑, 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑠𝑝𝑖 correspond to their Compustat data item equivalents of cash taxes paid, 
pretax income and special items. Missing 𝑠𝑝𝑖 are reset to 0, while any 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 with a negative 
denominator is reset to missing. Non-missing 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 are winsorized at 0 and 1. By nature of this 
approach, 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 would always be missing for the final (penultimate) firm-year of a firm in our 
panel. For the final (penultimate) firm-year, we therefore substitute 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 with 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅(2). 
Applying a forward-looking 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 comes with the advantage that potential tax knowledge 
spillovers from strategic alliances can be directly linked to the year of network initiation. 
3.2.2. Low-tax and High-tax Networks 
For tax knowledge spillovers to occur, at least one network participant must possess sophisticated tax 
knowledge. Therefore, we classify the strategic alliances in our dataset into low-tax and high-tax 
networks. Applying a forward-looking 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 for our output analysis has the advantage of aligning 
any influence on the 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 directly to the year of network initiation. However, identifying low-
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tax networks based on a forward-looking measurement would come with the disadvantage of concluding 
the type of input based on the output. For the identification of low-tax networks, we therefore consider 
a form of the 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3, which is constructed over a three-year preceding period: 
 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑖,𝑡=0 =
∑ (0𝑡=−2 𝑡𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑖,𝑡)
∑ (0𝑡=−2 𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡)
 (2) 
For every 𝑡 = 1 in which a new network is initiated, we consider the participants’ initial 
𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3, which is constructed from 𝑡 = −2 to 𝑡 = 0. For the first (second) firm-year of a firm 
in our panel, we substitute 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 with 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅(2). To increase the accuracy of our 
analysis, we require to observe the 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 and 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 of all participants in a network to 
be considered in our analysis (Table 1 Panel B). Figure 2 provides additional information regarding how 
we classify firms and networks as low-tax and high-tax observations. We identify low-tax firms based 
on their industry-adjusted 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 and allocate firm-year observations into 4 bins 
(𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘) according to the quartiles of the distribution of industry-adjusted 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3. Based on 
this, any firm observation that is aligned with the first 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 is treated as a low-tax firm in a 
network. A strategic alliance in which at least one participant qualifies as a low-tax firm is consequently 
treated as a low-tax network. Firms that do not qualify as low-tax firms are treated as high-tax firms, 
and networks in which none of the participants is a low-tax firm are qualified as high-tax networks. 
Thus, our identification strategy generally follows the classification method applied by Brown and 
Drake (2014), who focus on board ties with tax-avoiding firms. Because we are interested in whether 
strategic alliances serve as channels for tax knowledge diffusion between firms, we focus on high-tax 
firms in our analyses. We thereby distinguish between high-tax firms that invest in low-tax networks 
and high-tax firms that invest in high-tax networks (Table 1 Panel C). Further excluding multiple 
network initiations of one firm in a single year (to rule out overweighing of a firm in the panel), our 
identification strategy leads us to 197 observations of networks of high-tax firms to low-tax firms and 
540 observations of networks solely among high-tax firms. 
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3.3. Information on Networks and Firms 
[Table 2] 
Panel A of Table 2 contains information on the distribution of 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 by 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘, which 
is used to identify low-tax networks. While the mean 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 in the first bin of 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 
equals 7.08%, the average rises to 63.91% in the top 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘. Generally, the overlapping 
distribution of 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 by 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 points towards industry specifics in the tax burdens of 
the firms in our sample. The overall mean of 30.66% for 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 is relatively close to but below 
the federal corporate income tax rate of 35%, which is consistent with prior research on multi-period 
cash effective tax rates (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008)). Furthermore, Panel B of Table 2 
contains descriptive statistics for firm-level characteristics, separated by the classification of firms as 
low-tax or high-tax and by network type for high-tax firms. Panel B also includes firm-level accounting 
information (𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠), which are included in our regression analyses. Following Dyreng, 
Hanlon, and Maydew (2010), we show information on 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴3, 𝑅𝑛𝐷𝐸𝑥𝑝3, 𝐴𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝3, 𝑆𝐺𝐴3, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐸𝑥3, 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒3, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒3, 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ3, 𝑀𝑁𝐸3, 𝑁𝑂𝐿3, 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠3, 𝑃𝑃𝐸3, and 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒3.3 Consistently 
with 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3, these measures are constructed over rolling three-year periods. In Panel C of Table 2, 
we present information regarding the industry affiliation of networks and firms. Industry affiliation is 
determined on a two-digit SIC-code basis. It can be observed that the majority of networks operate in 
business services, while the investing firms are predominantly manufacturers and business service 
providers. For a better understanding of the networks in our sample, the Online Appendix provides 
additional information about a random selection of networks, including the date of network initiation, 
the investing firms, the qualification as high-tax or low-tax network and a brief deal description, which 
is extracted from SDC.   
                                                     
3 All variables are defined in detail in the Appendix.  
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4. Methodology 
4.1. Regression Analysis 
If engaging in low-tax strategic alliances is associated with tax knowledge diffusion, one should be able 
to identify increasing levels of tax planning at high-tax firms. Nevertheless, one could not draw any 
inferences if the influence of a network on a firm’s tax planning behavior as such were omitted. 
Consequently, our main variable of interest ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 is constructed as an indicator variable to 
distinguish between high-tax firms that enter into high-tax networks (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 0) and high-tax 
firms that engage in low-tax networks (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 1). By running our regression among high-tax 
firms, ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 isolates the incremental effect a low-tax network exerts on the high-tax 
firm’s 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒: 
 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡=1
=  𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒐𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊,𝒕=𝟏 + ∑  𝛽𝑛
𝑛
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡=1
𝑛
+ ∑  𝛽𝑙
𝑙
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡=1
𝑙 + ∑  𝛽𝑘
𝑘
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡=1
𝑘     
+ 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝜏𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 . 
(3) 
By using indicator notation (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤), the coefficient estimate describes the effect from moving from 
one condition to the other. As we use a three-year rolling specification of a firm’s cash effective tax rate 
(𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3) for identification purposes, we primarily measure 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 by 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3. 
Consistently, Kim et al. (2019) suggest that firms are able to adjust their tax planning behavior within 
three years. Consequently, the coefficient estimate for ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 would load negatively, if strategic 
alliances served as channels for tax knowledge diffusion. To alleviate concerns about interpreting a 
level-based dependent variable, we also construct the change-indicating variable 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3, 
which is 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 [𝑡1; 𝑡3] scaled by 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 [𝑡−2; 𝑡0]. Given a suggested average life span 
for strategic alliances of five years (Chan et al., 1997), we also measure 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 as 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅5 
and 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅5.  
[Figure 3] 
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Because strategic alliances go beyond bringing together high-tax and low-tax firms, we include vectors 
of variables on 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 & 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 in our main regression model. From Compustat data, we 
can infer whether network participants share an audit firm in the year of network initiation 
(𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟). Furthermore, we hand collect the geographical distance (as the crow flies) between 
the zip codes of the network participants’ headquarters to control for the potential impact of geographical 
proximity in tax knowledge diffusion (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦). We normalize 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 between 1 for the closest 
and 0 for the farthest distance, which allows us to interpret the sign of the coefficient in agreement with 
the sign of a potential indicator variable for a geographical linkage (as, for instance, in Brown (2011)). 
In our main regression, we do not include an indicator for firms belonging to the same industry 
(𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑), as we include industry fixed effects (𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑). Generally, business activities in a strategic 
alliance are in no way limited and could thus exert influence on the options of tax planning that are 
available for a network participant. Therefore, we are interested in the main business purpose of a 
strategic alliance (𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠). To derive this, we apply basic textual analysis. For illustration 
purposes, the word cloud depicted in Figure 3 shows the 50 most common words used in SDC’s deal 
descriptions of ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 networks. By systematically searching through the deal descriptions, we 
identify 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒, 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑛𝐷, 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒, 
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, and 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 as network activities, create 
respective indicator variables at the individual network level, and include these 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 in 
equation (3).4 Furthermore, we control for within-firm determinants of tax planning by including a 
vector of 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠. Thereby, we follow Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010) and include 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴3, 𝑅𝑛𝐷𝐸𝑥𝑝3, 𝐴𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝3, 𝑆𝐺𝐴3, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐸𝑥3, 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒3, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒3, 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ3, 𝑀𝑁𝐸3, 𝑁𝑂𝐿3, 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠3, 𝑃𝑃𝐸3, and 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒3. Consistent with 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3, these measures are constructed over 
rolling three-year periods. The Appendix includes a complete list of variable definitions. In addition to 
industry fixed effects (𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑), we include year fixed effects (𝜏𝑡) and cluster standard errors at the firm 
level (Petersen, 2009).5  
                                                     
4 The maximum correlation between ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 and one of the 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 is with 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 
(=0.0930, not tabulated).  
5 The sign and overall significance of our main variable of interest are not sensitive to design choices regarding 
fixed effects or clustering of standard errors.  
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4.2. Matched Panel: Difference-in-Differences  
The regression model in equation (3) allows us to directly align tax knowledge diffusion, which should 
occur over time, with the year of network initiation. This approach allows us to easily account for 
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 & 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠, although it condenses our panel to a cross section. An alternative 
approach for identifying tax knowledge diffusion is to maintain the panel structure of our data and apply 
a DiD methodology. In this model, treatment is generally in alignment with ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤. Additionally, 
we create an embargo period of eight years around a ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤-observation, during which a firm may 
not enter into an additional network. The embargo period contains the three years preceding and five 
years subsequent to network initiation. Our sample allows firms to enter into a network at any point in 
time of their discretion. We therefore compose a matched panel by matching control observations 
(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 =  0) to treatment observations (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 1) based on year and industry affiliation. 
As we no longer exploit cross-sectional but panel data, we adjust dependent and control variables from 
multi-period measures to their single-year versions: 
 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 ∗ 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒊,𝒕
+  ∑  𝛽𝑘
𝑘
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 . 
(4) 
In this model, 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 measures the baseline difference in 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅 that is not due to the presence of 
the treatment. The parameter 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 captures changes in 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅 from before to after treatment. The 
parameter of interest is the interaction 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡. It measures the effect on 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅 that is due 
to the treatment (i.e., low-tax network of high-tax firm). We include industry fixed effects and the annual 
measures of 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 as defined in the Appendix. Again, we base our inferences on standard 
errors clustered at the firm level (Petersen, 2009). 
4.3. Descriptive Analysis 
A firm’s decision to engage in a network is intentional and not random, which could lead to biased 
sample selection. Nevertheless, it is important to note that our study does not compare network firms 
with non-network firms but instead focuses on a within-comparison of network firms. Nevertheless, 
once a firm experiences a knowledge spillover via a low-tax network, engaging in subsequent networks 
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could, to some extent, also depend on an expected learning effect. Our sample could thus be 
nonrandomly selected, leading to concerns about endogenous treatment assignment (with regard to 
scholars on strategic alliances, see Carpenter, Li, and Jiang (2012)). One may account for this 
empirically by constructing a two-stage estimator (Heckman, 1979). Identifying valid covariates, which 
predict treatment assignment while having no direct impact on the dependent variable, is, however, 
difficult (Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov, 2013; Chan et al., 1997; McGuire, Omer, and Wang, 2012). 
Following the recommendation by Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012), we therefore want to highlight 
that our study potentially has an endogeneity problem that could affect inferences from OLS regressions. 
However, if tax planning were an endogenous choice based on having high effective tax rates prior to 
engaging in tax planning (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008), tax planning research would generally 
face endogeneity concerns. Additionally, prior research indicates that firms consider expected high 
taxation, measured as country-level corporate income tax rate, in the host country of a strategic alliance 
to be acceptable (i.e., positively associated) when forming an international network (Owen and Yawson, 
2013). For further mitigation purposes, we conduct a thorough descriptive analysis. As in our regression 
analyses, we analyze changes in the tax planning behavior of high-tax firms in strategic alliances with 
low-tax firms in comparison to high-tax firms in strategic alliances with high-tax firms. We start our 
descriptive analysis by comparing 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 [𝑡−2; 𝑡0] between the two groups. We then focus on 
our primary measure for 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 in the year of network initiation, 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 [𝑡1; 𝑡3], and test 
the significance of differences between the groups and within-group change. We then analyze the 
difference in the within-group change by applying a z test following Paternoster et al. (1998): 
 𝑧 =
𝑏1 − 𝑏2
√𝑆𝐸𝑏1
2 + 𝑆𝐸𝑏2
2
 (5) 
We also focus on an analysis of the development of 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 for intensified networking by 
firms in our sample. We thereby test for the existence of a gradual learning effect. 
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5. Results & Discussion 
5.1. Descriptive Insights 
[Table 3] 
The results of our descriptive analysis are depicted in Table 3. In Panel A, we compare changes in 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 between and within groups. Interestingly, the mean of 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 is very similar 
for high-tax firms in the period before investing in low-tax or high-tax networks, with 38.96% and 
39.35%, respectively (p-value of difference 0.8613). This alleviates concerns about analyzing level 
measures of 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 in equation (3). It also indicates that low-tax firms do not tend to stay 
among themselves by engaging in strategic alliances with sophisticated tax planners. For periods 
subsequent to the initiation of a network by high-tax firms, the distribution of 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 points towards 
a completely different direction. While observations of ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 1 are accompanied with a mean 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 of 27.55%, networks solely among high-tax firms (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 0) are aligned to an 
average 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 of 32.82%. The respective difference of 5.27% is also highly significant (p-value 
0.0065). Generally, we observe substantial reductions in cash effective tax rates for both groups (within-
group change), each being highly significant (p-values < 0.0000). These decreases could comprise 
reversion to the mean. However, this would not explain differences in the development between the 
groups. We therefore test whether the difference in the within-group change of 4.88 percentage points 
is significant and find it to be so (z-statistic -1.6994). In Panel B, we compare the development of 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 for high-tax firms’ involvement in low-tax and high-tax networks with a growing number 
of networks. In this test, we again observe lower levels of 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 for high-tax firms in low-tax 
networks, with differences increasing in intensified networking. Although our descriptive analysis does 
not allow us to include further covariates, we interpret our findings to be consistent with the notion of 
strategic alliances serving as channels for tax knowledge diffusion. Therefore, we are interested in 
whether multivariate regression results further support this notion.  
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5.2. Regression Results 
[Table 4] 
5.2.1. Multivariate Regression 
The main variable of interest in our regression analysis is ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 because it isolates the incremental 
effect a low-tax network exerts on a high-tax firm’s 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒. In Panel A of Table 4, we show 
multi-period specifications of 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 for equation (3) with 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3, 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3, 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅5 and 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅5. By observing multi-period measures, we can link our inferences to 
the period of network initiation. For brevity, we report only the coefficient estimates for ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 and 
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠. Throughout all specifications, the estimate for ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 is negative and highly 
significant. In the specification with 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 as the dependent variable, the estimate for ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 
has a magnitude of -0.0480 (p-value 0.0103), which is consistent with our descriptive inferences in terms 
of direction and magnitude. Because an overall network effect is absorbed by including high-tax firms 
in our regression and because the covariates on 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟, 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 & 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 account for a 
broad range of alternative explanations, we find it plausible to associate the (relative) increase in tax 
planning practices for high-tax firms in low-tax networks to be induced by the presence of the low-tax 
firm in the network. Extending equation (3) to a change-indicating variable, 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3, yields 
the same implications (p-value 0.0061). Furthermore, we extend our model to 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅5 and 
𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅5, which are constructed identically to 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 and 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 but over five 
years subsequent to and including the year of network initiation as the dependent variables. The results 
for these specifications imply a slightly smaller magnitude (coefficient estimate for (𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎) 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅5 
is -0.0376 (-0.1229)) in effects but are both negative and highly significant. Interestingly, the estimates 
for our 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠, namely, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 and 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟, do not surpass the usual levels of 
significance. In several additional analyses (see Section 6), we focus on the interactions of ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 
and 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 to align our findings with prior research. Overall, our findings in Panel A convey 
that decreases in cash taxes paid are driven by the partner firm’s tax planning behavior. 
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5.2.2. Difference-in-Differences 
[Figure 4] 
Panel B of Table 4 shows the results for our DiD analysis from equation (4). Any DiD specification 
relies on the parallel trend assumption. Otherwise, one could not empirically identify the posttreatment 
outcome absent the treatment. Usually, the parallel trend assumption is graphically examined by 
observing pretreatment trends of the dependent variable among the treatment and control groups. 
Accordingly, Panel A of Figure 4 provides visual evidence that the trends of 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅 are parallel for 
treatment and control firms prior to the treatment (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 =  1). Consistent with our analysis on 
the full sample, it can also be observed that the pretreatment levels of 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅 are very similar for the 
treated and untreated firms in the matched panel. While a direct empirical test for the parallel trend 
assumption is not possible, Patel and Seegert (2015) developed an approach to alleviate concerns about 
potential confounding factors. They suggest regressing the treatment indicator, time fixed effects and 
the interaction of the treatment indicator and time fixed effects on the dependent variable: 
 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝜏𝑡 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡. (6) 
They argue that failure to reject that the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms for  
𝜏𝑡 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 are jointly zero in the pretreatment period supports the parallel trend assumption. In 
Panel B of Figure 4, we therefore present the coefficient and the 95% confidence interval of the 
interaction of the treatment indicator and time fixed effects from equation (6) for the pretreatment years. 
First, none of the individual coefficients are significantly different from zero. More importantly, 
however, the p-value of the common trend test (the coefficients on 𝜏𝑡 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 are jointly zero during 
pretreatment) is far beyond the usual levels of significance (p = 0.7427). Consequently, we are able to 
provide visual and statistical evidence for the parallel trend assumption.  
In Panel B of Table 4, we depict several specifications of equation (4) with varying levels of 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 and industry fixed effects (𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑). The estimate for the interaction of 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 is 
negative and significant throughout all these specifications. Consequently, we find a negative 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅 
response to low-tax networks in comparison to high-tax networks for high-tax firms. Taken together, 
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the results from our descriptive and regression analyses are consistent with strategic alliances serving as 
channels through which tax knowledge diffuses between firms.  
5.2.3. Adjustment Speed 
We are further interested in how fast high-tax firms are able to adjust their tax planning behavior when 
cooperating with low-tax firms. Therefore, we estimate five specifications of equation (4). We extend 
the posttreatment period by one year with each specification. Thus, we notate 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 1 only for the 
year of network initiation [𝑡1] first, and finish with 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 equaling one for the complete embargo period 
[𝑡1; 𝑡5]. The coefficient estimates for 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 thus present the cumulative adjustment of a 
high-tax firm’s tax planning behavior with progressing time (𝑡1 to 𝑡5) when cooperating with low-tax 
firms (i.e. adjustment speed). The results for this analysis are presented in Panel C of Table 4. In 
concordance with theory suggesting that (tax) knowledge spillovers are likely to occur over time, the 
coefficient estimate for 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 is not significant when the posttreatment period is limited to 
the year of network initiation. The coefficient estimate for the interaction, however, turns significant 
when post equals one for 𝑡1 and 𝑡2. Furthermore, the estimated effect continues to be significant when 
extending the posttreatment period to 𝑡3, 𝑡4 and 𝑡5. Consequently, we assess high-tax firms on average 
to be able to adjust their tax planning behavior within two years of network initiation. These findings 
are consistent with recent research by Kim et al. (2019), who suggest that firms generally should be able 
to adjust their tax planning behavior within three years and that high-tax firms may increase their tax 
planning behavior even faster. Additionally, our results suggest that a firm’s adjustment of its tax 
planning behavior, once implemented, stays constant over subsequent years.   
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6. Additional Analyses 
[Table 5] 
Thus far, we have considered the overall implications of low-tax networks for high-tax firms. We are 
also interested in the characteristics of network participants, which could intensify or mitigate the 
identified learning effects. First, prior research provides mixed evidence regarding the role of auditors 
in tax knowledge diffusion (Klassen, Lisowsky, and Mescall, 2016; Lim et al., 2018; McGuire, Omer, 
and Wang, 2012). Furthermore, Brown (2011) and Brown and Drake (2014) hypothesized that 
geographical proximity and identical industry affiliation of the participants could enhance knowledge 
diffusion.  
In Panel A of Table 5, we compare two subsamples of networks, following the identification strategy of 
Brown (2011). One group consists of firms with their headquarters located in the same region, as defined 
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1).6 The other group consists of firms with 
headquarters located in different BEA regions in the year of network initiation (𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
0). The intuition behind this approach is that shared membership in a geographical region should allow 
higher levels of interfirm interaction. We run specifications of equation (3) with (𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎) 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 as 
the dependent variable and are interested in the interaction terms of ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 
because these coefficient estimates comprise the incremental influence of geographical proximity on tax 
knowledge diffusion via low-tax networks. However, we observe a significant coefficient estimate of 
the main effect of ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤. Neither 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 nor the interaction of the two are significantly 
different from zero. While this finding is generally consistent with the inferences by Brown (2011) on 
regional linkages, Cen et al. (2018) report that the correlation of effective tax rates is stronger for 
members of a supply chain that are located within the same geographical region.  
In their hypothesis development, Brown and Drake (2014) argue that similar background knowledge 
and similar capabilities should have a positive impact on tax knowledge diffusion. They suggest that 
firms with the same industry affiliation share the same operating environment, which they expect to 
                                                     
6 The respective BEA regions are Far West, Great Lakes, Mideast, New England, Plains, Rocky Mountains, 
Southeast and Southwest. 
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enhance the effect. However, the results from comparing intra- and interindustry board ties fall short of 
their expectation. To test the potential effect of shared industry affiliation, we construct, coinciding with 
our approach in Panel A,  two subsamples. One group consists of network participants who share 
industry affiliation (𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑 = 1), and the other group consists of firms with different industry 
affiliations (𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑 = 0). Consistent with Brown and Drake (2014) and in line with our inferences 
from geographical proximity, we cannot reject that the interactions of ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 and 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑 are 
significantly different from zero. Although this finding seems somewhat counterintuitive, we want to 
highlight that tax shelters are often repetitive among firms, not limited by industry barriers and serve as 
mass market tax saving ideas (Lisowsky, 2010). However, we observe that the main effect of 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑 
is negative and significant (p-value 0.0530 (0.0735) in the (𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎) 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 specification). 
Finally, we extend our analysis of network heterogeneity to examine the role of shared audit firms. 
Therefore, we analyze whether firms share an audit firm in the year of network initiation. Based on this, 
we construct an indicator variable (𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟) and interact it with ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤. In specifications of 
equation (3) with 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 and 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 as dependent variables, the interaction terms for 
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 respectively approach common levels of statistical significance. Our 
inferences take their place alongside a range of mixed inferences concerning auditors’ impact on tax 
knowledge diffusion. While Brown (2011) does not find significant tax shelter adoption via shared audit 
firms, and Klassen, Lisowsky, and Mescall (2016) show that less tax aggressiveness in the past is 
associated with the auditor preparing a firm’s tax return, Lim et al. (2018), and Cen et al. (2018) suggest 
that common auditors facilitate tax planning diffusion.  
Overall, the results presented in Table 5 might easily be subject to misinterpretation. We do not posit 
that industry affiliation, auditor ties or geographical proximity do not have an incremental effect on how 
tax knowledge diffuses between firms. We are interested solely in whether partner heterogeneity 
accelerates or alleviates tax knowledge diffusion for high-tax firms that invest in low-tax networks. It 
appears that tax knowledge diffusion via strategic alliances is rather unaffected by such heterogeneity.  
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7. Robustness Checks 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our primary findings with regard to alternative explanations 
and potential concerns about our identification strategy. Thereby, we rule out the possibility that our 
findings are unrelated to tax knowledge diffusion.  
7.1. Alternative Explanations 
[Table 6] 
Applying three-year rolling measures of cash effective tax rates would systematically exclude from our 
sample network-firm-observations that occur at the first, second, penultimate and final firm-years of a 
network participant. For identification purposes, we substitute [𝑝𝑟𝑒] 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 with 
[𝑝𝑟𝑒] 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅(2). However, it is possible that strategic alliances serve as preliminary ties between 
successive acquirers and targets (Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Porrini, 2004). Survivorship bias could thus 
exert influence on our inferences. Consequently, we present a specification of equation (3) in Panel A 
of Table 6 in which we exclude nonsurvivors (i.e., firms with a network-firm-observations within the 
last two years of their presence in our panel) from the analysis. In this model, we still find the loading 
of ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 to be significant (p-value 0.0571) and the economic magnitude to be consistent with our 
primary findings. This result indicates that our inferences are robust to survivorship bias.  
Another alternative explanation of our findings could be that the difference in the levels of 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 between the two groups in our sample is not induced by tax knowledge diffusion from 
low-tax firms to high-tax firms but by increases in 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 for high-tax firms in high-tax networks. 
[Figure 5] 
Figure 5 depicts a kernel density plot of the distribution of 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 for all high-tax firms. The 
dotted line at 𝑥 = 1 indicates the threshold between a decrease and an increase for 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 relative 
to 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3. It can be observed that part of the high-tax firm population experiences increases in 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3, which would, to some extent, not be consistent with knowledge diffusion. In Panel B of 
Table 6, we provide a specification of equation (3) in which we control for increases in 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 by 
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including only observations of 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 that are equal to or below the threshold of one. Again, 
our results indicate a negative and significant coefficient estimate for ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤. Consequently, we are 
confident that our inferences are based on tax knowledge diffusion via low-tax networks rather than on 
increases in 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 in the control group.  
While we find high-tax firms to receive tax knowledge via low-tax networks, we have not considered 
the tax position of low-tax firms. Correspondingly to high-tax firms, low-tax firms can be bound to 
either high-tax firms or low-tax firms. Intuitively, there is little reason to expect incremental or even 
“negative” tax knowledge spillovers for low-tax firms bound to high-tax firms. To empirically control 
for this notion, we construct 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ, which is an indicator that equals one for low-tax firms in 
networks with high-tax firms and zero for low-tax firms in low-tax networks. The results for this 
specification of equation (3) are presented in Panel C of Table 6. The coefficient estimate for 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 
is far beyond common levels of significance, with a p-value of 0.9961. This finding further supports our 
inferences of tax knowledge diffusion occurring among high-tax firms.  
Since effective tax rates are influenced by tax payments and profitability, changes in 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 could 
be solely income induced. This would to some extent speak against identifying tax knowledge diffusion. 
To account for this concern, we construct 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴3, which is the annual average growth rate 
in 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 from 𝑡1 to 𝑡3 (geometric mean). We then run equation (3) with 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴3 as the 
dependent variable and find the coefficient estimate for ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 to be nonsignificant (p-value 
0.6569) and of small economic magnitude (Panel D of Table 6). From this, it follows that the identified 
effects are not linked to profitability.  
[Figure 6] 
Finally, our inferences could be explained by aspects of firm structure. Strategic alliances could, for 
instance, be formed around the same time a firm returns to profitability. Additionally, networks could 
open foreign markets for the participants, which would allow profit shifting to tax havens. However, 
there is little reason to expect high-tax firms to experience these changes in low-tax networks 
(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 contains the incremental effect on a firm’s tax position). Nevertheless, we depict the (three-
year) annual average growth rates for foreign income (𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂3) and tax loss carry forward 
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(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑁𝑂𝐿3) separated by ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 in Figure 6. It can be observed that the distributions are nearly 
identical. We interpret this as follows. Low-tax networks are channels for tax knowledge diffusion from 
low-tax firms to high-tax firms. They are, however, not necessarily accompanied by incremental 
structural changes for the group of “treated” firms. This complicates the identification of mechanisms 
through which tax knowledge diffuses, as this process seems to be driven by soft factors rather than by 
exposing itself in (one) explicit accounting measure(s) of firm structure. 
7.2. Alternative Identification Strategy 
[Table 7] 
There are some judgment calls involved in classifying strategic alliances as high-tax- and low-tax 
networks and including an indicator variable in the respective regression. Therefore, we provide a 
modified model in which we regress the industry-adjusted 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 [𝑡−2; 𝑡0] of a firm and of its 
partner on the firm’s 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 [𝑡1; 𝑡3]:  
 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑖,𝑡=1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑤𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑑_𝑎𝑑𝑗_𝑝𝑟𝑒_𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑖,𝑡=0
+ 𝜷𝟐𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒓_𝒊𝒏𝒅_𝒂𝒅𝒋_𝒑𝒓𝒆_𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒉_𝑬𝑻𝑹𝟑𝒊,𝒕=𝟎
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑛
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡=1
𝑛   
+ ∑  𝛽𝑙
𝑙
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡=1
𝑙       
+ ∑  𝛽𝑘
𝑘
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡=1
𝑘  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
(7) 
Since we use industry-adjusted measures of 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 in this model, we do not insert industry fixed 
effects. However, we include the indicator 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑 in addition to the 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 
(𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑡𝑦). If the partner firm’s tax position were correlated with the firm’s own levels 
of tax planning, one would find a positive coefficient estimate of 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟_𝑖𝑛𝑑_𝑎𝑑𝑗_𝑝𝑟𝑒_𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝐸𝑇𝑅3. 
In a first specification of equation (7), we include network-firm-observations of low-tax firms and high-
tax firms. The results are depicted in Panel A of Table 7. While we observe a positive and highly 
significant coefficient estimate of 𝑂𝑤𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑑_𝑎𝑑𝑗_𝑝𝑟𝑒_𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝐸𝑇𝑅3, 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟_𝑖𝑛𝑑_𝑎𝑑𝑗_𝑝𝑟𝑒_𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝐸𝑇𝑅3 is not significant. The latter finding is, however, little surprising 
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given the inference that low-tax firms are rather unaffected by their partner firms’ tax positions (Table 6 
Panel C). Therefore, we include network-firm-observations of high-tax firms in a second specification 
of equation (7). In this model, the coefficient estimate of 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟_𝑖𝑛𝑑_𝑎𝑑𝑗_𝑝𝑟𝑒_𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝐸𝑇𝑅3 is 
significant (p-value 0.0936). Consistent with the findings from our main analysis and with the notion of 
tax knowledge diffusion via strategic alliances, we find a positive association between partner firms’ 
cash effective tax rates. 
8. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to further shed light on channels through which tax knowledge diffuses 
between firms. Despite solid insights on within-firm determinants of corporate tax planning, research 
on cross-firm connections in this field is still developing. We contribute to this emerging literature by 
being the first to identify strategic alliances as channels of tax knowledge diffusion between firms. Using 
data on strategic alliances between publicly traded US firms, we are able to distinguish between 
networks that bring together high-tax and low-tax firms and networks that are established among high-
tax firms respectively. Our results suggest that strategic alliances provide channels through which tax 
knowledge diffuses from low-tax firms to undersheltered firms. This identified channel should interest 
corporate executives, regulators, and researchers because the perception and valuation of the 
documented spillovers highly depend on the respective point of view. 
Although prior research has dedicated substantial attention to corporate cooperation and individual 
firms’ tax planning, there are a number of unanswered questions regarding the interplay of the two. 
Primarily, we encourage research on the actual mechanisms of tax knowledge diffusion. Furthermore, 
it remains unclear whether the tax position of a potential network partner influences the decision of a 
firm to invest in a specific strategic alliance. Our hope is that our study enhances interdisciplinary 
research in accounting and management.   
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition (Compustat/SDC equivalent) 
Network Characteristics  
𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉-𝒕𝒂𝒙 𝒏𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌 Equals 1 for networks with solely high-tax firms as participants. 
𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒐𝒍𝒐𝒘 Indicator variable; equals 1 for high-tax firms in low-tax 
networks; equals 0 for high-tax firms in high-tax networks; if a 
firm enters into multiple networks in one year, only one 
observation of this firm enters our sample in this year. In these 
cases, network selection is primarily done on a randomized basis. 
However, if a firm entered as high-tax firm into a low-tax network 
and into (a) high-tax network(s) in one year, we keep the low-tax 
network observation. 
𝒍𝒐𝒘-𝒕𝒂𝒙 𝒏𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌 Equals 1 for networks involving at least one low-tax firm. 
𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒐𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉 Indicator variable; equals 1 for low-tax firms in high-tax 
networks; equals 0 for low-tax firms in low-tax networks. 
∑ 𝒏𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔 Indicator variables for the main business purpose of a network, 
which is derived from a network’s deal description (DealText) in 
SDC; comprises PurposeWholesale, PurposeRnD, 
PurposeLicensing, PurposeService, PurposeMarketing, 
PurposeSupply and PurposeManufacture; information is 
systematically extracted with R: dofile available upon request.  
Partner Characteristics 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒙𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒚 Distance (as the crow flies) between the participants of a network 
according to the zip code of the participants’ headquarters 
(addzip); collected from freemaptools.com; normalized between 
1 and 0 for closest (same addzip) and farthest distance. 
𝑺𝒂𝒎𝒆𝑨𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒐𝒓 Indicator variable; equals 1 when all participants of a network 
share the same auditor firm (au) in the year of network initiation; 
0 otherwise; by nature of construction missing for non-network-
firm-observations. 
𝑺𝒂𝒎𝒆𝑰𝒏𝒅 Constructed as SameAuditor but for industry affiliation; industry 
is classified using two-digit SIC codes (sic); see also Table 2. 
𝑺𝒂𝒎𝒆𝑩𝑬𝑨𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 Constructed as SameAuditor; equals 1 when all network 
participants are located in the same BEA region in the year of 
network initiation; 0 otherwise; the respective regions, as defined 
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, are Far West, Great Lakes, 
Mideast, New England, Plains, Rocky Mountains, Southeast and 
Southwest. 
∑ 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔 See Proximity and SameAuditor for main analysis (equation (3)).  
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Variable Definition (Compustat/SDC equivalent) 
Firm Characteristics 
𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒉 𝑬𝑻𝑹 Cash effective tax rate; defined as cash taxes paid (txpd) divided 
by pre-tax income (pi) before special items (spi); special items are 
reset to 0 when missing; cash ETR observations with negative 
denominator are reset to missing; winsorized at 0 and 1. 
𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒉 𝑬𝑻𝑹𝟑 Cash effective tax rate; defined as cash taxes paid (txpd) divided 
by pre-tax income (pi) before special items (spi); special items are 
reset to 0 when missing; numerator and denominator are 
constructed as the sum of the current and two subsequent years; 
observations with negative denominator are reset to missing; for 
the final (penultimate) firm-year of a firm substituted by cash 
ETR(2); winsorized at 0 and 1. 
𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒉 𝑬𝑻𝑹𝟓 Cash effective tax rate; constructed as cash ETR3, but for five 
years.  
𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝑬𝑩𝑰𝑻𝑫𝑨𝟑 Three-year annual average growth rate (geometric mean) of 
EBITDA (ebitda) (√𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑡3/𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑡1
3 − 1); reset to 0 when 
missing. 
𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝑷𝑰𝑭𝑶𝟑 Constructed as ChangeEBITDA3, but for foreign pre-tax income 
(pifo). 
𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝑵𝑶𝑳𝟑 Constructed as ChangeEBITDA3, but for tax loss carry forward 
(tlcf). 
𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒕𝒂 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒉 𝑬𝑻𝑹𝟑 Cash ETR3 [t1; t3] scaled by pre cash ETR3 [t-2; t0]. 
𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒕𝒂 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒉 𝑬𝑻𝑹𝟓 Cash ETR5 [t1; t5] scaled by pre cash ETR3 [t-2; t0]. 
𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉-𝒕𝒂𝒙 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎 Indicator variable; equals 1 when a firm’s industry adjusted pre 
cash ETR3[t-2; t0] is aligned to pre taxrank [2; 4] (if pre taxrank[t0] 
is missing, replaced by pre taxrank[t-1]); 0 otherwise. 
𝒍𝒐𝒘-𝒕𝒂𝒙 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎 
 
Indicator variable; equals 1 when a firm’s industry adjusted pre 
cash ETR3[t-2; t0] is aligned to pre taxrank = 1 (if pre taxrank[t0] 
is missing, replaced by pre taxrank[t-1]); 0 otherwise. 
𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕 Indicator variable; equals 0 for a period of three years before 
network initiation and 1 for a period of five years subsequent to 
initiation and includes treatment/control observations. post 
constitutes an embargo period during which no other hightolow 
observation may occur.  
𝒑𝒓𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒉 𝑬𝑻𝑹𝟑 Constructed as cash ETR3 but with numerator and denominator 
constructed as the sum of the current and two preceding periods; 
for first (second) firm-year of a firm substituted by pre cash 
ETR(2). 
𝒑𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒂𝒙𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒌 Allocates ranks (1-4) according to the quartiles of the distribution 
of industry adjusted pre cash ETR3; 1 for the bottom end, 4 for 
the top end of the distribution. 
𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 Treatment is in alignment with hightolow (see post for embargo 
period) and extended to pre- and post-periods. 
𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 ∗ 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕 Interaction of treated and post; main variable of interest in 
difference-in-differences model. 
 34 
 
Variable Definition (Compustat/SDC equivalent) 
Firm Controls* 
𝑨𝒅𝑬𝒙𝒑𝟑 Advertising expense (xad) divided by net sales (sale); numerator 
and denominator are constructed as the sum of the current and two 
subsequent years; when missing reset to annual measure, 
thereafter reset to 0. 
𝑪𝒂𝒑𝑬𝒙𝟑 Reported capital expenditures (capx) divided by gross property, 
plant, and equipment (ppegt); numerator and denominator are 
constructed as the sum of the current and two subsequent years; 
when missing reset to annual measure, thereafter reset to 0. 
𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝟑 Cash and cash equivalents (che) divided by total assets (at); 
numerator and denominator are constructed as the sum of the 
current and two subsequent years; when missing reset to annual 
measure, thereafter reset to 0. 
𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝟑 Three-year annual average growth rate (geometric mean) of net 
sales (sale) (√𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡3/𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡1
3 − 1); when missing reset to annual 
change, thereafter reset to 0. 
𝑬𝑩𝑰𝑻𝑫𝑨𝟑 Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(ebitda) scaled by total assets (at); numerator and denominator are 
constructed as the sum of the current and two subsequent years; 
when missing reset to annual measure, thereafter reset to 0. 
𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔𝟑 The ratio of intangible assets (intan) to total assets (at); numerator 
and denominator are constructed as the sum of the current and two 
subsequent years; when missing reset to annual measure, 
thereafter reset to 0. 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝟑 The sum of long-term debt (dltt) and long-term debt in current 
liabilities (dlc) divided by total assets (at); numerator and 
denominator are constructed as the sum of the current and two 
subsequent years; when missing reset to annual measure, 
thereafter reset to 0. 
𝑴𝑵𝑬𝟑 Indicator variable; equals 1 if pifo > 0 (non-missing, non-zero 
value for pre-tax income from foreign operations), 0 otherwise; 
measured as the sum over three years. 
𝑵𝑶𝑳𝟑 Indicator variable equals 1 if tlcf > 0 (non-missing, non-zero value 
of tax loss carry forward), 0 otherwise; measured as the sum over 
three years. 
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝟑 Gross property, plant, and equipment (ppegt) divided by total 
assets (at); numerator and denominator are constructed as the sum 
of the current and two subsequent years; when missing reset to 
annual measure, thereafter reset to 0. 
𝑹𝒏𝑫𝑬𝒙𝒑𝟑 Research and development expenses (xrd) scaled by net sales 
(sale); numerator and denominator are constructed as the sum of 
the current and two subsequent years; when missing reset to 
annual measure, thereafter reset to 0. 
  
  
 35 
 
Variable Definition (Compustat/SDC equivalent) 
𝑺𝑮𝑨𝟑 Selling, general, and administrative expense (xsga); divided by 
net sales (sale); numerator and denominator are constructed as the 
sum of the current and two subsequent years; when missing reset 
to annual measure, thereafter reset to 0. 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝟑  The natural log of total assets (at) for the respective and two 
subsequent periods; when missing reset to annual measure, 
thereafter reset to 0. 
 
*Continuous 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 are winsorized at p1 and p99 and not mean centered.  
 
  
 
Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
This figure categorizes prior research regarding tax knowledge diffusion. It aligns the framework 
(institutional setting) of the identified channels. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
This figure summarizes our identification strategy. For simplification purposes, we show the strategic 
alliances of two participants in the upper right corner. The heartbeat pictogram at t1 indicates the year of 
initiation of a strategic alliance. We also show a specification of equation (3), where 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 
is measured as 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3.  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
The word cloud depicted in Figure 3 shows the 50 most common words used in SDC’s deal description 
of ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 networks. By systematically searching through the deal descriptions, we identify 
𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒, 𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 and 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 activities as well as 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, providing 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 and engaging in a 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛 as major business 
purposes of the networks in our sample.  
 
 
  
  
 
Figure 4 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel A of this figure provides visual evidence that the trend of cash ETR is similar for treatment and 
control firms prior to the treatment. In Panel B, we apply the approach by Patel and Seegert (2015) to 
provide statistical evidence for the parallel trend assumption. The panel reports the coefficient and 95% 
confidence interval of the interaction of the treatment indicator and time fixed effects for pretreatment 
years from the specification 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ß0 +  ß1 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 +  𝜏𝑡 +  𝜏𝑡 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡. We test 
that the coefficients on 𝜏𝑡 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 are jointly zero in the pretreatment period and fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. This supports the parallel trend assumption. The p-value for the parallel trend test is reported 
at the bottom of Panel B.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
This figure depicts a kernel density plot of the distribution of 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 for high-tax firms. The 
dotted line at x = 1 indicates the threshold between a decrease and an increase in 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 relative to 
𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3. The Appendix contains detailed definitions of all variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
This figure depicts the kernel density distribution of the three-year annual average growth in foreign 
pretax income (𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑜) and tax loss carry forward (𝑡𝑙𝑐𝑓) for high-tax firms in high-tax and low-tax 
networks (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 =  1 𝑣𝑠. 0). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Tables  
Table 1 Sample Selection & Identification Strategy 
 
All variables are defined in detail in the Appendix. Data items from Compustat and SDC Platinum are in parentheses. 
 
 
Panel A Compustat & SDC Platinum Data 
    
network-firm-
observations 
networks firms firm-years 
Compustat and SDC Platinum dataset of network firms matched according to year of network 
initiation (DateEffective), US firms only (loc, fic, curcd), sample period 1994 - 2016 (fyear) 
17798 15387 3570 52914 
./. requirement to identify all contracting parties in network 4159 2064 1603 19447 
            
            
Panel B Identification Strategy: Missing Information 
    network-firm-observations 
all network-firm-observations in sample 4159 
./. missing pre cash ETR3 [t-2; t0] 2520 
./. missing cash ETR3 [t1; t3] 2247 
./. requirement to identify pre cash ETR3 and cash ETR3 of all participants in network 1301 
            
            
Panel C Identification Strategy: Classification of network-firm-observations 
  low-tax partner high-tax partner ∑ 
low-tax firm [including multiple new networks of a firm in one year] 58 [78] 159 [225] 217 [303] 
high-tax firm [including multiple new networks of a firm in one year] 197 [226] 540 [772] 737 [998] 
  255 [304] 699 [997]  954 [1301] 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Information on Networks and Firms 
Panel A pre cash ETR3 by pre taxrank 
  N mean min p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 max 
pre taxrank = 1 2872  0.0708  0.0000  0.0000  0.0228  0.0699  0.1136  0.1515  0.2213 
pre taxrank = 2 2872  0.2104  0.1055  0.1549  0.1836  0.2107  0.2367  0.2643  0.3255 
pre taxrank = 3 2872  0.3062  0.2161  0.2577  0.2801  0.3047  0.3316  0.3602  0.4197 
pre taxrank = 4 2872  0.6391  0.3094  0.3559  0.3973  0.4979  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
pre cash ETR3 11488  0.3066  0.0000  0.0141  0.1527  0.2599  0.3574  1.0000  1.0000 
                    
                    
Panel B Descriptive Statistics 
  low-tax firm in network 
high-tax firm in low-tax 
network (hightolow = 1) 
high-tax firm in high-tax 
network (hightolow = 0) 
  N mean p50 N mean p50 N mean p50 
cash ETR 294  0.1396  0.1166 193  0.2708  0.2533 520  0.2918  0.2659 
cash ETR3 303  0.2017  0.1544 197  0.2755  0.2516 540  0.3282  0.2715 
cash ETR5 231  0.1836  0.1618 162  0.2366  0.2313 434  0.2697  0.2586 
EBITDA3 303  0.1387  0.1291 197  0.1527  0.1455 540  0.1582  0.1503 
RnDExp3 303  0.1031  0.0959 197  0.0737  0.0489 540  0.0614  0.0296 
AdExp3 303  0.0129  0.0000 197  0.0147  0.0000 540  0.0138  0.0000 
SGA3 303  0.3471  0.3363 197  0.2702  0.2720 540  0.2599  0.2432 
CapEx3 303  0.2082  0.1488 197  0.1536  0.1131 540  0.1598  0.1258 
ChangeSale3 303  0.0693  0.0524 197  0.0484  0.0337 540  0.0605  0.0393 
Leverage3 303  0.1681  0.1123 197  0.1815  0.1849 540  0.1942  0.1879 
Cash3 303  0.2647  0.2180 197  0.1818  0.1254 540  0.1657  0.1040 
MNE3 303  0.6931  1.0000 197  0.6041  1.0000 540  0.5444  1.0000 
NOL3 303  0.3432  0.0000 197  0.3503  0.0000 540  0.2722  0.0000 
Intangibles3 303  0.1556  0.0854 197  0.1844  0.1363 540  0.1585  0.0877 
PPE3 303  0.3067  0.2204 197  0.4116  0.3313 540  0.4341  0.3286 
Size3 303  9.1756  9.1257 197  9.6259  9.5942 540  9.1201  9.2695 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 2 Information on Networks and Firms (continued) 
Panel C Industry Affiliation of Networks and Firms (two-digit SIC-code) 
      industry of networks ∑  
    # I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII   
in
d
u
st
ry
 o
f 
fi
rm
s 
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing (01-09) I 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Mining (10-14) II 0 6 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 12 
Construction (15-17) III 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
Manufacturing: Chemical & Allied Products (28) IV 0 0 0 26 15 0 23 0 20 8 35 0 127 
Manufacturing (20-39, except 28) V 0 4 2 11 167 17 41 4 39 131 48 7 471 
Transportation & Public Utilities (40-49) VI 0 3 2 0 7 32 4 0 1 30 10 0 89 
Wholesale Trade (50-51) VII 0 1 0 0 3 2 19 1 3 8 4 0 41 
Retail Trade (52-59) VIII 0 0 0 0 4 3 9 1 4 10 2 2 35 
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate (60-67) IX 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 25 17 6 2 56 
Services: Business Services (73) X 0 0 0 1 31 10 21 3 22 273 22 3 386 
Services (70-89, except 73) XI 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 4 8 16 0 33 
Nonclassifiable Establishments (99) XII 0 0 0 3 8 6 1 0 4 15 8 0 45 
      0 14 4 44 238 78 124 10 122 500 153 14 1301 
 
All variables are defined in detail in the Appendix.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Analysis 
Panel A Comparison of cash ETR3 change between and within groups 
    
high-tax firm in low-tax 
network (hightolow = 1) 
high-tax firm in high-tax 
network (hightolow = 0) 
      
    N mean N mean difference p-value 
pre cash ETR3 [t-2; t0] I 197  0.3896 540  0.3935 - 0.0039    (0.8613) 
cash ETR3 [t1; t3] II 197  0.2755 540  0.3282 - 0.0527 ***  (0.0065) 
                  
Within-group change (hightolow = 1) I to II         - 0.1141 ***  (0.0000) 
Within-group change (hightolow = 0) I to II         - 0.0653 ***  (0.0000) 
                z-statistic 
Difference in within-group change            - 0.0488 * -1.6994 
                  
                  
Panel B Comparison of cash ETR3-development for intensified networking 
    
high-tax firm in low-tax 
network (hightolow = 1) 
high-tax firm in high-tax 
network (hightolow = 0) 
      
    N mean N mean difference p-value 
1st  and 2nd high-/low-tax network I 153  0.2922 418  0.3390 - 0.0468 **  (0.0376) 
subsequent (≥3) high-/low-tax networks II 44  0.2174 122  0.2915 - 0.0740 **  (0.0455) 
 
All variables are defined in detail in the Appendix.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 4 Main Analysis 
Panel A Regression Analysis 
Dependent variable cash ETR3   delta cash ETR3   cash ETR5   delta cash ETR5 
  coefficient p-value   coefficient p-value   coefficient p-value   coefficient p-value 
hightolow - 0.0480 **  (0.0103)   - 0.2062 ***  (0.0061)   - 0.0376 ***  (0.0087)   - 0.1229 **  (0.0191) 
Proximity - 0.0877    (0.1171)   - 0.2488    (0.2795)    0.0269    (0.4762)    0.1089    (0.4028) 
SameAuditor - 0.0107    (0.6173)   - 0.0427    (0.6201)    0.0107    (0.5414)    0.0309    (0.6342) 
Network controls Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Firm controls Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Fixed effects Industry & Year   Industry & Year   Industry & Year   Industry & Year 
SE cluster Firm   Firm   Firm   Firm 
Observations 735   735   594   594 
Adjusted R2  0.1233    0.1047    0.0577    0.1228 
 
Superscripts ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for two-tailed tests. The results for equation (3) are presented in 
Panel A. Our main variable of interest is ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤, which is an indicator variable set equal to 1 for observations of high-tax firms cooperating with low-tax firms 
and set equal to 0 for high-tax firms cooperating with high-tax firms. The number of observations is decreased from 737 to 735 (596 to 594) by two singleton 
observations in the fixed effects. All variables are defined in detail in the Appendix.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Main Analysis (continued) 
Panel B Matched Panel: Difference-in-Differences 
Dependent variable cash ETR   cash ETR   cash ETR 
  coefficient p-value   coefficient p-value   coefficient p-value 
treated  0.0221    (0.3097)    0.0140    (0.5047)    0.0137    (0.5268) 
post  0.0364 **  (0.0372)    0.0374 **  (0.0291)    0.0350 *  (0.0536) 
treated*post - 0.0695 **  (0.0159)   - 0.0710 **  (0.0132)   - 0.0699 **  (0.0131) 
Firm controls No   No   Yes (annual measures) 
Fixed effects No   Industry   Industry 
SE cluster Firm   Firm   Firm 
Observations 609   609   609 
Adjusted R2  0.0052    0.0239    0.0431 
 
Superscripts ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for two-
tailed tests. Panel B depicts the results for equation (4). We compose our sample by creating an embargo 
period of eight years (from -3 to +5 years) around an ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 observation during which no further 
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 observations may occur. We match control observations (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 =  0) according to 
year and industry to each treatment occurrence (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 =  1). All variables are defined in detail in 
the Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Main Analysis (continued) 
Panel C Adjustment Speed 
Dependent variable cash ETR 
(#) of specification coefficient p-value 
(1) treated*post [t1] - 0.0555    (0.1946) 
(2) treated*post [t1; t2] - 0.0988 **  (0.0154) 
(3) treated*post [t1; t3] - 0.0697 **  (0.0423) 
(4) treated*post [t1; t4] - 0.0765 **  (0.0118) 
(5) treated*post [t1; t5] - 0.0699 **  (0.0131) 
Controls Firm (annual measures) & treated & post 
Fixed effects Industry 
SE cluster Firm 
Observations 331; 405; 479; 545; 609 
Adjusted R2 0.0403; 0.0505; 0.0359; 0.0420; 0.0431 
 
Superscripts ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for two-
tailed tests. Panel C depicts the results for five specifications of equation (4). The posttreatment period 
is extended by one year for each specification (from 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 [𝑡1] to 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 [𝑡1; 𝑡5]). 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 
remains 0 for 𝑡−2 to 𝑡0 throughout all specifications. The coefficient estimates for 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 
present the cumulative adjustment (i.e. adjustment speed) in a high-tax firm’s tax planning behavior 
with progressing time when cooperating with low-tax firms.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Additional Analyses 
Panel A Headquarters 
Dependent variable cash ETR3   delta cash ETR3 
  coefficient p-value   coefficient p-value 
hightolow - 0.0579 *** (0.0033) 
  
- 0.1912 ** (0.0107) 
  
SameBEARegion - 0.0316   (0.1938) 
  
- 0.0474   (0.6590) 
  
hightolow*SameBEARegion  0.0524   (0.2386) 
  
- 0.0486   (0.7772) 
  
Controls Network & Firm   Network & Firm 
Fixed effects Industry & Year   Industry & Year 
SE cluster Firm   Firm 
Observations 735   735 
Adjusted R2  0.1233    0.1040 
                
                
Panel B Industry 
Dependent variable cash ETR3   delta cash ETR3 
  coefficient p-value   coefficient p-value 
hightolow - 0.0678 *** (0.0078) 
  
- 0.2505 ** (0.0197) 
  
SameInd - 0.0403 * (0.0530) 
  
- 0.1567 * (0.0735) 
  
hightolow*SameInd  0.0526   (0.1267) 
  
 0.1348   (0.3235) 
  
Controls Network & Firm   Network & Firm 
Fixed effects Year   Year 
SE cluster Firm   Firm 
Observations 736   736 
Adjusted R2  0.1215    0.1079 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Additional Analyses (continued) 
Panel C Auditor 
Dependent variable cash ETR3   delta cash ETR3 
  coefficient p-value   coefficient p-value 
hightolow - 0.0428 ** (0.0367) 
  
- 0.2152 *** (0.0077) 
  
SameAuditor - 0.0042   (0.8833) 
  
 0.0594   (0.5950) 
  
hightolow*SameAuditor - 0.0237   (0.5566) 
  
0.0642   (0.6976) 
  
Controls Network & Firm   Network & Firm 
Fixed effects Industry & Year   Industry & Year 
SE cluster Firm   Firm 
Observations 735   735 
Adjusted R2  0.1213    0.1037 
 
Superscripts ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for two-
tailed tests. In Panel A, we test for the impact of geographical distance between the headquarters of 
cooperating firms. Distance is measured by an indicator variable that is set equal to one if network 
participants are headquartered in the same region, as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, at 
network initiation. Panel B follows the approach of Panel A for the industry affiliation of network 
participants. We interact ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 with an indicator for changes to a shared audit firm within three 
years of the network initiation in Panel C. All variables are defined in detail in the Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Table 6 Robustness Checks: Alternative Explanations 
Panel A Survivorship Bias     Panel B Increases in cash ETR3 
Dependent variable cash ETR3     Dependent variable delta cash ETR3 
Specification exclude nonsurvivors     Specification 
only if  
delta cash ETR ≤ 1 
  coefficient p-value       coefficient p-value 
hightolow - 0.0279 *  (0.0571) 
    
hightolow - 0.0543 *  (0.0950) 
    
Proximity - 0.0663    (0.1718)     Proximity - 0.0398    (0.7199) 
SameAuditor - 0.0109    (0.5264)     SameAuditor - 0.0216    (0.5289) 
Network controls No   Network controls No 
Firm controls Yes     Firm controls Yes 
Fixed effects Industry & Year     Fixed effects Industry & Year 
SE cluster Firm     SE cluster Firm 
Observations 638     Observations 455 
Adjusted R2  0.0966     Adjusted R2  0.1603 
                    
                    
Panel C Impact on low-tax firms     Panel D Effect on Profitability 
Dependent variable cash ETR3     Dependent variable ChangeEBITDA3 
Specification only low-tax firms             
  coefficient p-value       coefficient p-value 
lowtohigh - 0.0002    (0.9961) 
    
hightolow - 0.0069    (0.6569) 
    
Proximity  0.2021    (0.1885)     Proximity  0.0287    (0.4767) 
SameAuditor - 0.0140    (0.5520)     SameAuditor - 0.0194    (0.1936) 
Network controls No   Network controls Yes 
Firm controls Yes   Firm controls Yes (no EBITDA3) 
Fixed effects Industry & Year   Fixed effects Industry & Year 
SE cluster Firm   SE cluster Firm 
Observations 301   Observations 735 
Adjusted R2  0.0666   Adjusted R2  0.3577 
 
Superscripts ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for two-
tailed tests. In Panel A, nonsurvivors are excluded from the sample. A firm is deemed a nonsurvivor if 
the year of network initiation is the final or penultimate fiscal year of coverage of this firm in our panel. 
Panel B excludes increases in 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 [𝑡1; 𝑡3] in comparison to 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅3 [𝑡−2; 𝑡0]. We 
change our focus from high-tax to low-tax firms in Panel C and construct an indicator variable 
𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ, which is set equal to one for low-tax firms in networks with high-tax firms and equal to 
zero for low-tax firms in networks with other low-tax firms. We cannot include 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 
because we have the relevant information for networks of high-tax firms. In Panel D, we control for the 
(three-year) average annual growth rate in EBITDA (𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴3) subsequent to network 
initiation. All variables are defined in detail in the Appendix. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 7 Robustness Checks: Identification Strategy 
Panel A Low-tax- and high-tax firms     Panel B Only high-tax firms  
Dependent variable cash ETR3 [t1; t3]     Dependent variable cash ETR3 [t1; t3] 
Specification 
low-tax- and  
high-tax firms 
    Specification high-tax firms only 
  coefficient p-value       coefficient p-value 
Own industry-adjusted pre cash ETR3 [t-2; t0]  0.1606 ***  (0.0000) 
    
Own industry-adjusted pre cash ETR3 [t-2; t0]  0.0616    (0.1216) 
    
Partner industry-adjusted pre cash ETR3 [t-2; t0]  0.0300    (0.2828) 
    
Partner industry-adjusted pre cash ETR3 [t-2; t0]  0.0592 *  (0.0936) 
    
Proximity - 0.0579    (0.1812)     Proximity - 0.0760   (0.1004) 
SameAuditor - 0.0133   (0.3777)   SameAuditor - 0.0134   (0.5110) 
SameInd - 0.0249 *   (0.0600)     SameInd - 0.0337 *  (0.0551) 
Network controls No   Network controls Yes 
Firm controls Yes     Firm controls Yes 
Fixed effects No     Fixed effects No 
SE cluster Firm     SE cluster Firm 
Observations 1276     Observations 728 
Adjusted R2  0.1487     Adjusted R2  0.1211 
 
Superscripts ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for two-tailed tests. We examine correlations of cash effective tax rates 
between network participants. Panel A contains low-tax and high-tax firms in network-firm-observations. Panel B is limited to only high-tax firms. Both panels are 
limited to networks of two participants. We cannot include 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 in Panel A because we collected information for networks of high-tax firms. All 
variables are defined in detail in the Appendix. 
 
 
  
 
Online Appendix: Information on Networks and Firms 
 
Random Sample of Networks and their main Business Purpose 
date effective high-tax firm name (conm) partner firm name (conm) hightolow deal description [extract] 
17-May-95 NOVELL INC MICROSOFT CORP 1 jointly provide customer service and support expertise in order to meet the needs 
of customers who use products from both companies 
06-Jun-95 3COM CORP DSP GROUP INC 1 license to use speech compression technology for product (faxmodem) 
29-Jan-96 MCI COMMUNICATIONS MICROSOFT CORP 0 jointly develop and market web services 
11-Jun-97 SCHERING-PLOUGH DENDRITE INTERNATIONAL INC 0 license to provide database software services 
26-Sep-97 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP CSP INC 0 develop a processor  
02-Feb-98 PHARMACIA & UPJOHN INC CHIRON CORP 0 research Hepatitis C virus and sharing of worldwide marketing rights 
11-Jun-98 CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY CORP ROHM AND HAAS CO  0 license for usage of injection molding technology  
06-Jul-98 ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORP ENGINEERING ANIMATION INC 0 cross-license and joint marketing and integration of applications to create 
interface between visproducts and data management software  
01-Dec-98 ACTION PERFORMANCE COS INC CHAMPSHIP AUTO RACING 
TEAM 
1 manufacture products (cart series and Fedex championship logos) in the United 
States  
06-Jan-99 APPLIED MATERIALS INC PLASMA-THEMR INC  0 license to cross-integrate product (cluster tool) 
19-May-99 SPARTAN MOTORS INC FEDERAL SIGNAL CORP 0 purchase agreement to improve cost lines and benefit operating units  
23-Apr-01 CLOROX CO/DE OIL DRI CORP AMERICA 0 wholesale and supply of products (cat litter) 
21-Aug-02 PEOPLESOFT INC MERCURY INTERACTIVE CORP 1 accelerate implementation and upgrades of applications for customers  
12-Sep-03 BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC CURATIVE HEALTH SERVICES 
INC 
1 wholesale of products (drugs for the prevention and control of bleeding) 
22-Dec-03 JOHNSON & JOHNSON ANIKA THERAPEUTICS INC  1 wholesale of products (drugs) with partial prepayment from Johnson & Johnson 
22-Jan-07 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP BOEING CO 1 marketing and promotional services (air transportation system and equipment) 
22-May-07 PACER INTERNATIONAL INC TRAILER BRIDGE INC 1 provide freight services (container hauling) between United States and Puerto 
Rico 
22-Sep-08 JOHNSON & JOHNSON ANIKA THERAPEUTICS INC  1 wholesale and distribution of products (drugs for the treatment of pain) in South 
America, Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico 
18-Mar-09 HARRIS CORP MCAFEE INC 0 develop software (cyber mission management and security software) to provide 
network operators with heightened levels of situational awareness 
12-Feb-13 PFIZER INC AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES INC 1 develop and commercialize companion diagnostics and provide advisory 
services  
 
This table provides information regarding the main business purpose of networks (random draw), which are classified either ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 1 or ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 0. 
 
